Un vrai bijou !
MESSAGE: (#147023) Re: Austrian skirmishers - usage?
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AUTHOR: Bill Haggart
DATE: 8/11/2013, 11:54 am
Reply to: (#) Re: Austrian skirmishers - usage?
Author: Christopher....
Date: 8/11/2013, 4:01 am
I appreciate the enormous effort you put in to produce those interesting
examples. My sources are somewhat more general - Radetzky for example
commenting that skirmishing can only be limited as the Austrians do not
understand this kind of fighting. Krieg 1809 also comments that the Austrian
approach was totally wrong relying on formalized drill (Krieg 1809 I 113). The
general impression that the Grenzer were not as good light troops as during
the seven years war (practically any Austrian general you care to name). Gill
is also good on the deficencies of the skirmishers particularly in wooded
ground during the Abensberg phase of the campaign.
Christopher:
Skirmishing continues to be general mystery to most writers. Colin comments on
how that form of combat is often overlooked completely. The problem with such
comments are that they are 1. general conclusion statements on a large number
of instances, and 2. usually stated without any context. For instance, the
1809 Krieg comment criticizing the Austian Approach to skirmishing is a good
example. Part of the purpose of the Krieg 1809 history was to point out where
things could be done better in the future. You see the same kind of serious
criticisms of the 1791 French regulations, [and one reason the provisional
1792 instructions were produced]. What you don't see is later readers assuming
because of the criticisms that the French couldn't maneuver in formation.
That context is important. Too often historians are passing on conclusion
statements from other historians without question, or looking for a neat quote
in order to close the book on some question. The often quoted Radetzky comment
is a good example.
This was provided by Mr. Frayer, who did the research:
Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon,‎ by Rory
Muir (1988), page 51
"By 1813 the Austrians had virtually given up, believing that the great bulk
of their infantry lacked the training and aptitude needed for the the role. As
Radetzky observed in September 1813, 'fighting en tirailleure [skirmishing]
should be done only in a very restricted fashion because neither the Russians
nor we have mastered the mani�re de tirailleur.'"This passage in Muir is
footnoted as follows:
Quoted in Gunther E. Rothenberg, Napoleon's Greatest Adversaries: The Archduke
Charles and the Austrian Army (London, Batsford, 1982), p.184. "Austria had,
of course, lost her traditional source of light infantry when Napoleon annexed
Croatia (part of the Illyrian Provinces) in 1809."In Rothenberg (page 111 in
later edition, page 184 in the first edition), the text reads:
"Rigidly controlled and regimented, the Austrian skirmishers rarely were the
equal to the French. Some observers blamed this on national aptitude. The able
Radetzky, probably the best young general to come out of these wars, observed
ruefully that ''operations en tirailleure can only be conducted in a very
limited manner because we do not understand this kind of fighting.' A German
officer, on the other hand, argued that it was not national character but 'too
much drill' that made the Austrians less effective skirmishers than the
French."
Only the parts in bold are the Radetzky material. The rest is not.
Incidentally, "en tirailleure" is mangled French. It should be "en
tirailleur". Also, "mani�re de tirailleur" is not actually idiomatic French.
It appears only in these English-language books, as far as I know.
The British Light Infantry Arm 1790-1815, by David Gates (1987) has the
version as per Muir (who himself cites Rothenburg, who has the other version).
Redcoat: the British soldier in the age of horse and musket‎ by Richard
Holmes (2002) also has this version. Both spell "tirailleur" correctly, though
Muir and Rothenburg do not.
Once There Were Titans: Napoleon's Generals and Their Battles 1800-1815‎
by Kevin Kiley (2007) offered a paraphrase that expanded the quote attributed
to Radetzky with an assertion of his "belief" and "the conclusion".
"The Austrian General Radetzky observed that neither the Austrians nor the
Russians understood fighting in open order and believed that skirmishers could
be used in a very small, limited way. The conclusion that was reached was that
the Austrians were not the equal of the French when fighting in open order."
All these trace to a citation something like "KAV Alte Feldakten 1813
Deutschland Hauptarmee F/10 436b". I can find no prior citation of this source
prior to the anglophone authors listed above � first in 1982 or 1987
(depending on which version you are looking at). Since they have substantially
different versions, I assume both Gates and Rothenburg saw the text in the
original language.
"KAV" is a little odd. Better would be something like "�sterreichisches
Staatsarchiv / Kriegsarchiv Wien", but these are all written by anglophones
who call the place "Vienna". For a document in September, one would have
expected "Faszikel IX" (not "F/10", as they are monthly and should use Roman
numerals), but perhaps the piece was filed by date of receipt, or lumped in
with Leipzig documents, or some such. The number "436b" tells us that it was
about the 437th document of the month under the given heading. Specifically,
the "b" should indicate that the document was inserted in the sequence
sometime after the original transfer of documents from the war ministry to the
archives. Good "Germanic" organization skills!
In any case, the Radetzky quote is from a General Staff Order (that's what's
in those document files), from the staff of the Army of Bohemia. It was not an
analytical comment, not a summary judgment voiced in retrospect, not a
considered opinion, not a part of a staff history, nor anything similar. I
have no idea what the original document said, not least because it is quoted
in two different versions. The Gates version looks much more plausible to me,
although it appeared in print some 5 years after the Rothenburg version. Still
unless we have the original (in German? in French for the benefit of the
Russians?), we really have no idea of the exact meaning (or of who mangled the
French language). What we do know is that it applied (only) to the Army of
Bohemia just before Leipzig.
What we also do know is the size of the "specialist" light infantry of the
Army of Bohemia, the army which amounted overall to 317 battalions, 167
squadrons and 72 batteries outside of the Russian/Prussian Guard.
With the Austrian divisions [were the possible specialist lights]-
-- 5 Austrian Jager battalions
-- 10 Grenz battalions
With the Graf Vitgenshteyn -
-- 16 Russian Jager battalions (all still in the process of rebuilding with
conscripts after the 1812 and early 1813 campaign)
-- 1 Prussian Sch�tzen battalion (equivalent)
Total of 32 battalions, or about 10% of the infantry
The specialist light infantry arm was clearly very understrength (and mostly
raw recruits for the Russians). The usual Russian ratio was 33% light
infantry. So, whatever Radetzky ordered, it was aimed mostly at the use of
recently re-built, rather ill-trained conscript "heavy" "line" infantry units
in the skirmishing role. There is no general comment being made, no comparison
to the French, no element of national characteristics that can obviously and
clearly taken as Radetzky's meaning (re-read the text in bold above), unless
one has already decided (in advance) that this is what you wish he had said.
The Russians understood the problem and played along. The Graf Raevskiy
detached whole Grenadier regiments (experienced, selected men) from the
Reserve to act as skirmishers and help make up a more typical ratio. Assumedly
Radetzky approved, right?
BH: Some, like Dave Hollins, have noted this contextual issue: ". By Wagram,
the Austrian accounts are again pointing back to an "as required" approach.
Unfortunately, too many authors have focused on Radetzky's comments about the
Austrians "not understanding skirmishing" � Radetzky was a cavalryman and
indulging in the kind of language that all reformers use, although the comment
also reflects the lack of trained troops by 1813."
The conclusion usually reached by writers quoting Radetzky is that the
Austrians avoided skirmishing and/or did it very badly. A 1813 comment can't
be used to characterize an army's ability over 25 years of war. There is no
evidence that the Austrians avoided skimrishing and how well they did is open
to interpretation. I do know that throughout those 25 years of war one comment
has been very consistant: Don't deploy too many skirmishers: Charles 1796,
Mack 1800, 1805,
While not conclusive, this is what we find the overall Austrian commander
repeatedly writing to his subordinates: , in 1812, FM Schwarzenberg ordered
that "In open ground, 20-30 skirmishers will be enough to hold enemy
skirmishers from the front of the battalion or mass". He conceded, however,
"In restricted ground they can be increased to one third of the battalion, but
the remianing two thirds must remain closed up in one or more reserves
depending on terrain." Several times beginning in the 1812 campaign and into
the 1813 battles, Schwarzenberg writes to his subordinates: 'To dissolve
battalions into skirmish order would ... be a mistake.' Now why would he
repeatedly say that if the Austrians didn't understand skirmishing and avoided
it?
Examples showing that the Army of Bohemia did engage in skirmishing
successfully are easily found:
In October 1813, at Hanau, 2nd battalion IR14 "moved forward to support the
Bavarian skirmishers in front of the Lamberwald. When their skirmishers were
driven back, skirmishers of this battalion moved forward, established a lively
fire and halted the enemy advance."
How often and how well the Austrians skirmished in comparison to the French is
certainly an open question, depending on the year, the units, and the
circumstances.
I find the entire topicof skirmishing during the period fascinating, and often
misunderstood.
